For a long time, Chinese contract manufacturers, such as Foxconn, Luxshare Precision, and Goertek, have been dubbed "Apple workers." This term, frankly, isn't a pleasant one, as it often implies that Chinese companies are forced to rely on cheap labor to perform low-paying tasks in the consumer electronics and tech product value chains, arguably the world's most lucrative. But things are changing now. In September of this year, a bombshell announcement rocked the tech world: OpenAI, Silicon Valley's most prominent AI giant, had approached China's Luxshare Precision to collaborate on AI hardware. This wasn't a simple contract manufacturing relationship. According to The Information, OpenAI and Luxshare Precision have reached a strategic partnership agreement to jointly develop a consumer AI device, with mass production expected as early as late 2026 or early 2027. This time, Luxshare Precision is no longer simply a "contract manufacturer," but will work with OpenAI to "jointly define products and participate in software and hardware collaboration." This news is truly significant: it signifies that a large number of Chinese companies, represented by Luxshare Precision, have achieved substantial progress in industrial upgrading. Chinese companies with mastered manufacturing expertise have already gained considerable influence. Luxshare Precision's move is no accident. Since the tariff war began in April of this year, Apple has gradually shifted production to India and Vietnam. Coupled with Apple's increasingly sluggish innovation in recent years, investors have become increasingly aware that the growth of Apple supply chain companies is simply a function of Apple's new product sales multiplied by market share, lacking a rationale for independent growth. If Apple's innovation slows (as seen with the iPhone's slowdown for several generations), the valuations of Apple supply chain companies will immediately come under pressure. This situation raises the question: Can domestic contract manufacturers survive without Apple? Or are there more promising options? The beginning of transformation: Luxshare Precision's collaboration with OpenAI is just a microcosm of the broader transformation of Apple supply chain companies. In recent years, every Apple supply chain company with a modicum of strength has been desperately seeking new paths forward. Luxshare Precision's transformation over the past few years can be considered one of the most successful examples. Overall, Luxshare Precision's revenue growth is fastest from its new energy vehicle business. Luxshare Precision primarily manufactures wiring harnesses, connectors, charging components, and smart cockpit electronic modules for new energy vehicles—critical components that safely and efficiently connect electricity, signals, and data within the vehicle. Currently, new energy vehicle revenue accounts for 39.47% of Luxshare Precision's revenue, reaching 4.998 billion yuan. The company boasts a formidable automotive client list, including Tesla, CATL, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Volkswagen. Goertek has taken a different approach, placing its bets on the VR/AR market. In 2020, Goertek signed an exclusive contract with Meta's Oculus for its next-generation products, securing an order. In 2022, Goertek's smart hardware business, including AR/VR products, accounted for 60% of its revenue, surpassing its acoustic device business for two consecutive years, with revenue increasing by over 90% year-on-year. The most thorough and successful transformation has undoubtedly been achieved by Foxconn Industrial Internet. This company, which was born out of Foxconn, has now transformed itself into the absolute leader in AI server manufacturing. In the first half of 2024, Foxconn Industrial Internet's net profit reached 12.113 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 38.6%. More importantly, through cloud computing business, Foxconn Industrial Internet's revenue exceeded the communications and mobile network equipment business for the first time, becoming a new revenue pillar. On the technical level, Foxconn Industrial Internet is also quite capable. The superfluid liquid cooling solution jointly developed by the company and NVIDIA can meet the heat dissipation requirements of the 1200W power consumption of the Blackwell chip. From product design, key components to system delivery, Foxconn Industrial Internet has established a complete AI server industry chain capability. Xinwangda, which used to make batteries for Apple, has also vigorously transformed into the new energy track in recent years and has become a battery supplier for car companies such as Weilai, Xiaopeng, and Dongfeng. At present, these three companies account for 72% of its installed capacity in 2023. More crucially, Wei, Xiaoli, and Li Auto directly invested in Xinwangda, establishing a deep "customer + shareholder" relationship. Xinwangda achieved this not through storytelling, but through proven performance—244Wh/kg energy density, 50,000 cycle life, and reliable operation at -30°C—to carve out a niche for itself amidst the competition from CATL and BYD. Looking at the transformation cases of these Apple supply chain companies, it's easy to spot a common thread: they've all moved beyond simple contract manufacturers and have begun penetrating into new sectors like new energy vehicles and AI servers. The logic behind this is simple. While manufacturing is an industry that emphasizes standards, leading companies in each niche market possess their own unique "processes." When these processes reach peak performance, they transcend mere "cheap labor" and expand across a wide range of related industries, becoming essential "solutions" for the industry. The "real gold" forged in contract manufacturing: When it comes to the unique "processes" honed through contract manufacturing, Foxconn Industrial Internet is a prime example. In the AI ​​era, Foxconn Industrial Internet (FII) provides far more than just hardware assembly. It offers a one-stop solution encompassing design, R&D, manufacturing, and even advanced thermal technologies like liquid cooling. As early as 2015, FII partnered with Alibaba to develop immersion liquid cooling (also known as "immersion cooling") products. Their fourth-generation AI servers currently utilize both water and air cooling technologies. The immersion cabinets achieve a Power Use Effectiveness (PUE) of 1.03, with values ​​closer to 1 indicating higher efficiency. Traditional air-cooled data centers typically achieve PUEs above 1.5. By 2023, FII's AI server shipments will account for nearly 40% of global shipments, placing it firmly in the top tier internationally for liquid-cooled models. This integrated capability, from design, manufacturing, to delivery, is unmatched by many pure liquid cooling technology companies, such as GRC in the US and Submer in the UK. At this point, some may wonder: How did these Apple supply chain companies make the leap from making mobile phone parts to manufacturing cars and AI servers? Can technology be easily swapped? The answer is not necessarily true. There's a very interesting logic behind this "technology transfer." Let's first discuss the core: precision manufacturing technology. Take Luxshare Precision, for example. They originally made connectors—those small parts that plug into mobile phones. Don't underestimate these things; they involve a lot of skills: micron-level precision, guaranteed to last tens of thousands of plug-in and unplug cycles, high and low temperature resistance, and electromagnetic interference resistance... These skills all embody the essence of "precision." But think about it another way: don't the charging ports and battery connectors in new energy vehicles face the same demands? In fact, the requirements are even higher—car connectors are expected to last for over a decade, while mobile phones only last three to five years at most. So, Luxshare Precision's entry into the automotive market is essentially upgrading its "mobile phone-grade" precision manufacturing technology to "automotive-grade" levels. The technical path is the same, only the standards are more stringent. The example of Foxconn Industrial Internet is even more interesting. As we all know, iPhones are getting thinner and thinner, but their processors are getting more powerful. This poses a major problem: heat dissipation. How can heat be efficiently dissipated in such a small space? To address this issue, Foxconn Industrial Internet (FII) has invested heavily in researching various heat dissipation technologies: thermal conductive materials, heat dissipation structure design, and heat pipe technology. In the AI ​​era, AI servers have far greater cooling requirements than iPhones. Nvidia's H100 chip consumes 700W of power, and the new Blackwell chip reaches 1200W. This is equivalent to the heat generated by hundreds of iPhones concentrated in a single tiny chip. However, the technical principles are the same: the goal is to quickly transfer heat away from the source. FII's accumulated experience in thermal conductive material formulations, heat dissipation structure design, and even its understanding of air flow can all be utilized. The only difference is the upgrade from milliwatts to kilowatts, and from air cooling to liquid cooling. Furthermore, Apple's notoriously stringent product quality standards—"zero defects" and "full traceability"—have long been fundamental to Apple supply chain companies. The quality management system developed as a result has become their key strength. Therefore, the core reason for these Apple supply chain companies' successful transformation lies not in their mastery of specific product manufacturing technologies, but rather a universal "precision manufacturing methodology." This is the true value earned day after day on the production line. While Apple supply chain companies have partially transitioned from manufacturing to intelligent manufacturing, leveraging the skills and knowledge accumulated through their previous contract manufacturing experience, simply "breaking away from Apple" is only the first step to survival. The real path forward lies in finding a new role. If these companies simply focus on switching major clients (e.g., from Apple to Tesla), they're still stuck in their old ways and will never be able to achieve independence. Furthermore, given the current Sino-US tensions, this structure, where all major clients are from mainland China, is inherently fraught with uncertainty. Therefore, the true potential for these former Apple supply chain companies lies in transitioning from "OEM parts" to "system definition." In the Apple era, Apple supply chain companies were "hanging on a single phone." But in today's increasingly important era of AI, manufacturing needs are fragmented: there are startups developing AI glasses, laboratories developing humanoid robots, and local governments building edge data centers... They all require reliable, flexible manufacturing partners capable of small batches and rapid iteration. If Apple supply chain companies can package the entire suite of capabilities they used to serve Apple—supply chain, quality control, and automation—into "Manufacturing as a Service" (MaaS), they could become the "water, electricity, and gas" for AI hardware innovation. Just as TSMC doesn't make phones, but its chip manufacturing underpins the entire semiconductor ecosystem, future Apple supply chain leaders may not make cars or robots, but all AI hardware will be inseparable from it. This "Manufacturing as a Service" model bears a strong resemblance to the traditional SaaS model. SaaS, standing for "Software as a Service," literally translates to "software as a service." Think of the apps on your phone. Take Didi Chuxing: In the past, hailing a ride meant either manually hailing one on the street or calling a taxi company. Now, just open your phone and tap it. In the past, if you wanted takeout, you had to call the restaurant for delivery. Now, if you want Sichuan cuisine or hot pot, you can just open Meituan and order it with a few taps. "Manufacturing as a Service" (MaaS) simply means transforming complex "factory management" into a simple, easy-to-use program like a mobile app. This transforms Apple supply chain companies from "OEMs" into "intelligent manufacturing service providers." They're no longer simply selling physical labor; they're creating an "industrial Meituan Takeout"—allowing any business to access world-class manufacturing services anytime, anywhere, just like ordering takeout. Moreover, this concept is no longer just wishful thinking; it's already being demonstrated in real-world cases. A prime example is Foxconn's "MIH Electric Vehicle Open Platform." MIH (Mobility in Harmony) is Foxconn's open ecosystem for electric vehicles, encompassing "hardware, software, and supply chain," launched in 2020. Its core logic is simple: "You have a brand, algorithms, and users, but can't build a car? No problem. We'll provide you with the chassis, three-electric system, electronic architecture, supply chain, and even help you find a contract manufacturer—all you have to do is define the product." This essentially packages Foxconn's decades of experience serving Apple, Dell, and Cisco, encompassing vehicle-level integration capabilities, global supply chains, automated production lines, and quality control systems, into a single "electric vehicle manufacturing operating system." Currently, over 1,900 companies have joined the MIH Alliance, including Qualcomm, Nvidia, Arm, and CATL. Even Fisker in the United States and Thailand's national electric vehicle program are using this platform to develop models. In the AI ​​era, if these Apple supply chain companies leverage the data and knowledge they've amassed over the years into various "industrial apps," a single process solution could simultaneously serve thousands of factories; new process optimizations could be distributed to all customers via "cloud updates"; and every factory's production data could be used to train AI models, optimizing process standards across the industry. This allows contract manufacturers to leap from the bottom of the value chain to the top, transforming from "contract manufacturers" into "intelligent manufacturing platforms." They then hold onto these software-based patents and reverse-license them to brands, collecting platform and patent fees. Some might argue that with the widespread adoption of robots and automated factories, China's demographic dividend and cheap labor advantages will eventually disappear. At that point, AI and automation will gradually close the global manufacturing gap. However, this idea of ​​relying on "automation" to conquer the world clearly underestimates the complexity of manufacturing. The reason is that while manual labor can be replaced by machines, valuable knowledge and experience are the industry's treasures, which even AI cannot replace. Manufacturing is indeed an industry that values ​​standards, but these are "customer-given standards," not "standards of how they are achieved." Apple's requirements for its Chinese contract manufacturers are indeed clear: "Total earphone thickness 5.3mm, ±0.05mm tolerance, IPX4 waterproof rating, Bluetooth latency <80ms..." But the question is, how can you actually manufacture products that meet these requirements? The answer is: it all depends on the contract manufacturers' own "trial and error," assembling and understanding. This is called industry know-how—without decades of deep industry experience, you simply can't master it. This knowledge is ingrained in the minds of veterans, hidden in process documentation, and etched into equipment specifications. And this is precisely the greatest asset that Chinese companies have in becoming "intelligent manufacturing platforms" in the AI ​​era. The laws of nature are clear, and change is inevitable. In this era of great change, only those companies that can turn "crisis" into "opportunity" will be able to buck the trend. Luxshare Precision has gone from being an Apple component supplier to a partner of OpenAI; Foxconn Industrial Internet has gone from being an iPhone OEM to a leading AI server manufacturer; Goertek has gone from being a traditional acoustic component manufacturer to a major player in the VR/AR field... Ten years ago, without Apple, China's OEMs would have been in mourning. But now, even without Apple, China's OEMs are on their own growth trajectory.

1. Overnight Transformation: The October autumn breeze brought not a cool breeze but a biting chill to the global electronics industry. On October 8th, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) struck another blow, adding 26 entities and three addresses to the "Entity List," including 16 Chinese companies and three Hong Kong addresses. The U.S. also reiterated the "50% rule" applicable to the Entity List: any foreign entity directly or indirectly, individually or in aggregate, holding 50% or more of the listed entities will automatically be subject to the same licensing requirements as the listed entities.   The official reason cited "suspected diversion of U.S.-made components into specific drone supply chains." The separate inclusion of the three Hong Kong addresses on the list means that any transactions involving items covered by the EAR for entities registered or operating at these addresses will automatically trigger a "presumption of denial" review. This "address control" model bypasses circumvention tactics such as company name changes and enables permanent monitoring of cross-border trade nodes, signaling that the tech war has escalated from targeting specific companies to a systematic blockade of the entire industrial ecosystem. Note: Under EAR 744, any materials containing more than 25% US technology (not just chips, but also connectors, resistors, capacitors, and inductors) exported to Arrow's China/Hong Kong entities must first apply for an Individual Validated License (IVL). BIS adopts a presumption of denial policy for "Hong Kong addresses," effectively rejecting them by default. Experience shows that IVL approvals take an average of 75 calendar days, with a rejection rate exceeding 60%. Once rejected, the entire shipment must be rerouted or returned, significantly increasing logistics, warehousing, and capital costs by 8–12%. The three Hong Kong, China addresses listed are: 1614C, Hung Shui Kiu Main Street, Yuen Long, N.T., Hong Kong; 17Rm. 1605A, Ho King Commercial Center, 2-16 Fa Yuen Street, Mong Kok, Kowloon, Hong Kong; and 18Room 1605, Ho King Commercial Center, 2-16 Fa Yuen Street, Mong Kok, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Almost simultaneously, news arrived from the Netherlands that Nexperia, a subsidiary of Chinese semiconductor giant Wingtech Technology, had its assets frozen by a local court. This seemingly commercial dispute, however, reveals an increasingly intense geopolitical dynamic. Wingtech stated that China's previously implemented export control measures on rare earth-related items and technologies have already taken effect, and are viewed by the industry as a precise "reciprocal countermeasure" to its technological crackdown. Arrow, Nexperia, TI, NXP, ST... these once recognizable names in the Chinese market have now been thrust into the center of the storm. A massive wave, whipped up by political forces, is relentlessly slamming the global semiconductor division of labor built over the past three decades. As the tide recedes, we are stunned to discover that these giants, once adorned in the glittering "globalization" of their swim trunks, are now facing an unprecedented predicament of "swimming naked."   2. Arrow's "Shutdown"—The Instant Freeze of the World's Largest "Spot Reservoir" To understand the impact of Arrow's sanctions, we must first understand its role in the supply chain. It is no ordinary trader. As a top-four global electronic component distributor, Arrow serves as a "super hub" and "spot reservoir" connecting original equipment manufacturers with tens of thousands of end customers. With revenue reaching $28 billion (approximately RMB 203 billion) in fiscal year 2024, Arrow Electronics has been deeply rooted in the Chinese market for over 20 years. It represents products from over 200 international OEMs, including TI, ADI, NXP, ST, Infineon, Microchip, and Qualcomm, serving over 12,000 end customers. It's safe to say that any even slightly complex electronic product around you likely has its core components directly or indirectly sourced from Arrow's warehouses. This inclusion on the list is by no means an isolated incident; it signals a shift in US export control strategy from targeting end manufacturers to blocking the distribution chain. This will trigger a chain reaction in areas such as high-end manufacturing and supply chain management, and short-term pain is inevitable. The BIS ban is tantamount to abruptly shutting off the world's largest and most critical spot market. Arrow Asia Pacific accounts for approximately 18% of the circulating supply in China's distribution spot market, holding the largest inventory depths for core products such as TI, ADI, Xilinx, and Microchip. Regulations stipulate that the grace period will only last until November 7th. From now on, any materials subject to the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that attempt to be shipped through Arrow China/Hong Kong will be subject to a "default denial" licensing policy. This means it's not a matter of cost or delivery time, but rather a direct, legal severance of distribution. The impact is immediate and comprehensive: power management chips bear the brunt. As the largest component of Arrow's inventory, once their "reservoir" function ceases, demand-driven sectors like drones, automotive, and industrial sensors will be the first to feel the pain of supply disruptions. Certification cycles can last over six months, leading to a potentially frantic "daily price fluctuations" after the grace period. The battle for precision analog chips continues: op amps, ADCs/DACs, and other components face extremely high US technology barriers, and industrial customers' demanding performance makes replacements incredibly difficult. "A drift of a few tenths of a millivolt can devastate overall device performance," making the shortage of these chips a long, arduous process that will plague the entire industry chain. "Small Logic" Triggers "Major Line Shutdowns": Logic and interface chips may seem ordinary, but Arrow's "small particle" slicing services (1k/3k small packages) are the lifeblood of countless small and medium-sized customers. If supply is interrupted, these customers' production lines will be completely shut down due to the lack of a few chips worth only a few yuan, posing an extremely high risk. RF and MCUs: From Premium to Out-of-Stock: Due to certification lock-ins, RF chips face a replacement cycle of up to 9 months, causing prices to "jump." Microcontrollers are even worse off. With automotive and industrial specifications requiring lead times exceeding 26 weeks, Arrow's share of over 30% of domestic spot inventory has instantly dropped to zero. This results not in price increases but in a direct lack of demand, forcing customers to redesign boards and delay projects.   End-User Alternative Paths and Cost Estimation 1. Short-Term (0-3 Months): Utilizing "whitelisted" distributors such as Avnet, WT, and WPG is expected to result in a 2-4 week extension in delivery times and a 3-6% increase in procurement costs. 2. Medium-term (3–12 months): For highly dependent parts from TI/ADI, implement a "direct purchase + VMI" model—sign a CPPA with the original manufacturer, and have the manufacturer ship directly to the bonded warehouse. This can save 4–7% in intermediate costs, but requires a rolling 12-month forecast accuracy of ≥85%. 3. Long-term (>12 months): For irreplaceable materials with "25% US technology," such as Xilinx military-grade and TI aerospace-grade parts, initiate a "Design-Out" program and evaluate domestic brands such as Microchip PolarFire, Gaoyun, and Anlu. This is expected to increase BOM costs by 6–10%, but will completely eliminate licensing risks. Arrow's "blacklisting" is a precise "pull-out" move. It tells us that in today's highly globalized world, if any key node in the supply chain is disrupted by political influence, the chain reaction will be catastrophic. 3. Nexperia's "Freeze" – A "Crisis of Confidence" in China's Overseas Investment Model. If the Arrow incident was a frontal attack by the United States on a supply chain hub, then the freeze of Nexperia's assets in the Netherlands represents a more complex flanking attack. Nexperia, formerly the standard products division of Philips and NXP, is a leading global manufacturer of discrete devices, logic chips, and MOSFET devices. Its acquisition by Chinese-owned Wingtech Technology marked a successful "snake swallowing an elephant" acquisition by a Chinese company in the global semiconductor industry and is considered a model for Chinese capital integrating advanced international technology. However, this asset freeze (although stemming from a dispute over a final payment for a commercial acquisition) is situated within an extremely sensitive geopolitical context. With European and American countries tightening scrutiny of foreign investment, particularly Chinese investment in high-tech sectors, any technology company with ties to Chinese capital is vulnerable to becoming embroiled in political turmoil. The Anshi incident sends a dangerous signal: Even if you complete an acquisition through legal and compliant market practices, even if you operate legally in the local market, contributing taxes and creating jobs, you may still face unpredictable, non-commercial risks due to your "Chinese capital" background. Wingtech Statement This crisis isn't just for Anshi; it serves as a wake-up call for all Chinese companies attempting to upgrade their technology through global mergers and acquisitions. It shakes the foundations of the "Chinese capital going global" model—trust and legal safeguards. When business rules can be arbitrarily distorted by political will, the very foundation of global capital and technology flows begins to erode.   IV. Export Countermeasures: A Cognitive Approach to "Weaponized Dependence" and a Game of Threats. Faced with rounds of technological blockades, China isn't simply passively responding. The previously announced and implemented export controls on rare earth-related items and technologies are a well-considered "reciprocal countermeasure." These two metals are critical raw materials for the production of advanced semiconductors, radar, optoelectronic equipment, and other equipment, and China holds an overwhelmingly dominant position in the global supply. The significance of this countermeasure goes far beyond the short-term impact on specific industries. This clearly demonstrates to the world that the weaponization of supply chains is a double-edged sword, and dependence is mutual. You can cut off my access to high-end chips, and I can similarly affect your access to critical raw materials. This is the logic of "mutually assured destruction" playing out in the tech war. It forces all parties involved to reassess the true costs of "decoupling" or "de-risking." For economies like Europe, Japan, and South Korea, which are also deeply dependent on China's raw material supply, this is undoubtedly a sobering reminder: when choosing sides, they must weigh the vulnerabilities of their own supply chains.   V. "Swimming Naked" Across the Board: The Crisis of TI, NXP, and STMicroelectronics in Their Prosperous Times. When the storm sweeps in, the first to feel the biting chill may be the once-proud chip OEM giants. Texas Instruments, NXP, STMicroelectronics, Analog Devices... These names represent the crown jewels of the global semiconductor industry. They are deeply embedded in the Chinese market, deriving a significant portion of their revenue from this world's largest and most dynamic electronics manufacturing hub. Top distributors like Arrow are the capillaries that connect them to China's vast customer base. Today, capillaries are being severed one by one. "De-risking" has become "de-revenueing": "De-risking," a political slogan, is evolving into "de-marketing" and "de-revenueing" in business practice. Without orders from Chinese customers, how will these giants maintain their impressive financial reports? How can they sustain their high R&D investments? The rapid rise of alternatives: Sanctions and supply cuts have become the best "advertisement" and "catalyst" for Chinese chip companies. In the past, convincing a customer to use domestic chips might have required years of verification and relationship building. Now, customers are proactively seeking them out, willing to give domestic chips a chance and even collaborate on R&D. This is fostering the most formidable competitors of the future for companies like TI, NXP, and ST. A "Berlin Wall" in the supply chain: An invisible "technological Berlin Wall" is being erected. On one side is the "inside wall" supply chain based on the US technology system, while on the other is the "outside wall" market, which is excluded. Giants are forced to engage in "split personality" and design two or even multiple solutions. This significantly increases operating costs, reduces efficiency, and ultimately undermines global technological progress. They are "swimming naked." As the tide of global cooperation recedes, what they reveal is their over-reliance on a single political force and their inability to adapt to distorted market dynamics. They are both tools of pressure and victims of this game.   VI. Where does the future lie? — The Long March toward Independent Development and the Reshaping of Global Supply Chains. This unprecedented storm has clearly charted the course for the future. Domestic substitution has evolved from an "option" to a "must-have." There can be no more reliance on chance. From power management and analog chips to MCUs, a top-down wave of domestic substitution, driven by market panic and policy, has begun. This path is destined to be difficult, requiring time, patience, and sustained investment, but there is no turning back. Supply chains are evolving from "globalization" to "multipolarization." In one world, two or even more systems may coexist. In addition to the "traditional" systems of Europe and the United States, a China-led supply chain system and other regional supply chain alliances may gradually emerge. Enterprises must be able to survive and operate within multiple systems. "Security" will become a core factor alongside "performance" and "cost." Future product designs must consider supply chain security and resilience from the outset. "De-Americanization" and "De-C" (De-Sinicization) will become design principles for products from different product camps.   Conclusion: Say goodbye to illusions and prepare for the long march. Arrow's blacklisting, Nexperia's freeze, and export countermeasures... This series of events is not an isolated incident, but a turning point in an era. It heralds the end of the old era of warm and affectionate globalization based on "comparative advantage" and "market dominance." We are entering a "new normal" where geopolitics deeply interferes with the industrial chain. In this new normal, no one can remain immune: TI, NXP, ST, Nexperia, and Arrow. For the Chinese technology industry, this is a cruel "coming-of-age ceremony." It shatters our last illusions, forcing us to abandon shortcuts and face the core, fundamental technological innovation. The storm has arrived, and the only way is to get involved. Those who swim naked will eventually leave, while the true pioneers are now building their own boats. The clarion call of the chip war has sounded, and the long march towards independence has just begun.